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How much market do market-based instruments create? 














In the context of economic instruments for more energy efficiency and climate 
protection, tradable certificates have been investigated for renewable energy and for 
a number of emissions. In contrast, tradable energy efficiency – or  “white” – 
certificates have only lately been considered as a market-based tool to foster energy 
efficiency as compared to standards and labelling, for example.
 Theoretically, there is 
little doubt about the advantages. In practice, however, some fundamental problems 
arise. Critical issues are the design of an efficient artificial market for “white” 
certificates, its compatibility with the European emissions trading system, the 
identification of a suitable target group for an energy efficiency obligation and the 
measurement of energy savings as compared to a reference use of energy. We use the 
theoretical framework of Transaction Cost Economics to elaborate these issues. We 
conclude that transaction costs and investment specificity will restrict markets for 
“white” certificates in practise. Long-term contracts rather than spot trade will be the 
prevailing form of governance for energy efficiency investments. 
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1  Introduction and theoretical framework 
A number of economic and other instruments are under discussion to contribute to energy saving 
and climate protection objectives nationally and internationally, among them different forms of 
tradable certificates. Tradable “green” certificates for renewable energy, for example, have been 
investigated and tested for some time now, and the EU directive on an Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) for CO2 certificates has been approved in 2003. In contrast, tradable “white” 
certificates have only lately been celebrated as a market-based tool to foster energy efficiency.
1  
In this paper we concentrate on the design of a system for tradable “white” certificates and on 
conditions for guaranteeing the efficiency of the instrument. Theoretically, a tradable certificate 
system will allocate energy efficiency activities to the sites with minimum marginal costs, 
provided that number of conditions and principles are met. This includes additionality of the 
investment as compared to a business as usual development, measurability (or accuracy of 
information) of the realised savings, and practicability of the whole trading and verification 
system.  
In practice, this involves a number of challenges, most of them related to informational or 
transaction cost. For example, before issuing the “white” certificates, the factual savings have to 
be determined. For this purpose, a reference energy use or baseline without the efficiency 
measure has to be determined and compared to the energy consumption after implementing the 
efficiency measure. Aspects which need to be considered here include the problems and 
consequences of uncertainty and of leakage (e.g. site-specific “energy savings” by closing down 
a plant and importing the energy from abroad), but also the treatment of so-called no regret 
measures. A further issue is the integration of white certificates with the EU-wide emissions 
trading system. Altogether, the assessment of potentially efficient designs for a system of 
tradable “white” certificates requires a careful analysis of the problematic issues and approaches 
to manage them in practice.  
Theoretical starting point for our reasoning is the concept of Transaction Cost Economics (TCE). 
TCE focus on the choice of an appropriate organisation of economic activities (in other words: 
an appropriate governance structure). It starts from the observation that information is not 
complete per se and that the human capacity to process information is limited. Improving access 
to and processing of information is related to costs. In consequence, human behaviour is guided 
 
1 One exemption are Rader and Norgaard 1996 who adverted to the applicability of the certificate concept to DSM 
rather early.  
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by the rule of satisficing rather than optimising. In this regard, TCE has the same roots like other 
scholars of the New Institutional Economics. People intend to act rational but are bounded by 
their own capacities of thinking. Economic actors hence take their decisions on the basis of 
imperfect information (Richter and Furobotn, 1999, p. 510) and bounded rationality (Simon, 
1957, p. 198). The pure existence of bounded rationality and imperfect information opens the 
door for so-called opportunistic behaviour, a rather euphemistic term for dishonesty, fraud and 
malice (Williamson, 1987). To summarise, any investment is inevitably related to additional 
costs, the so-called transaction costs. Transaction costs can take one of two forms, inputs of 
resources or a margin between the buying and selling price of a commodity in a given market 
(Stavins 1995, p. 134). The former are the direct costs of carrying out a transaction, i.e. costs for 
search, information and contracting, while the latter can be regarded as the opportunity costs 
incurred when an efficiency-enhancing transaction is not realised (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992, 
p. 604) The latter, also referred to as governance costs, stand very much in focus of TCE. We 
therefore extend our concept of investment and include transaction costs as part of the initial 
investment in an energy efficiency measure.  
An important concept of TCE is the notion of investment specificity. Investments can be specific, 
i.e. related to high sunk cost, or generic, i.e. easily transferable to another application. According 
to TCE, specific investments allow a more efficient production than more generic investments 
(Williamson, 1987). The higher the specificity of the investment the more will these efficiency 
gains occur only in the specific transaction. Thus, specific investments are characterised by 
quasi-rents, which can be derived from this investment in comparison to its next profitable 
application. For example, once an insulation has been fixed to a certain building, it delivers 
energy savings to the building user but cannot easily (if at all) be transferred to another building. 
It thus loses most of its initial market value, and the asset owner depends on sufficient payments 
by the building user to be able to recover his sunk costs and to realise the quasi-rent of the 
specific investment. The investment is highly specific to the transaction between the energy 
service provider and the building user. In contrast, a CHP-plant has a more generic character 
since it is more easily transferable to other applications. 
Investments specific to a certain transaction thus open the door for opportunism: The quasi-rent 
is on risk for opportunistic behaviour by a transaction partner (a customer, a retailer, …): This 
“partner” may threaten to refrain from buying the output of the investment and thus be able to 
appropriate at least a part of the quasi-rent. In anticipation of this danger, the asset owner has an 
incentive to invest in more generic assets with lower quasi-rents on risk but possibly also lower 
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efficiency
2. Alternatively, an appropriate governance structure may be established to safeguard 
the quasi-rents of specific investments against opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1987). In so 
doing, efficiency gains due to the specific investment can be realised, which is comparatively 
profitable for both transaction partners and increases overall social welfare as compared to low-
efficiency investments.  
To conclude, the extent of specificity of investments is a main determinant for the choice of 
appropriate governance mechanisms. The higher the specificity the more an efficient governance 
will be characterised by patterns of hierarchies or regulation. Such regulations may still allow for 
cooperative and intentional adaptations to changes in the environment, but they are connected to 
stricter accounting and auditing as administrative controls, and hence imply a lower incentive 
intensity. By contrast, low specificity of investments allows for pure governance by markets and 
thus to benefit from theoretically optimal incentive structures by profit-maximising behaviour. 
At the same time, the choice for an appropriate governance structure is not a choice exclusively 
between either markets or hierarchies, but may also lead to a hybrid governance structure with 
elements from both “sides”. 
In the case of energy efficiency (EE) investments, an additional opportunity for opportunistic 
behaviour may exist. As long as EE investments are not fully competitive by themselves, the 
external benefits of these investments due to reduced environmental impacts and higher security 
of supply need to be remunerated; otherwise the investments would not take place. Public 
regulations are a way to internalise these positive externalities, either by means of financial 
assistance or by compulsory efficiency standards. In the latter case, the state may appropriate the 
extra-rents accruing from the EE investment by altering the regulation. If for example the 
regulation is phased out untimely or unexpectedly, the EE investments will lose at least some of 
its value as the investor loses the expected extra-benefits from the regulation. To avoid such a 
situation or its anticipation (which would be a disincentive for future investments), a reliable 
‘regulatory contract’ (Birkenbach et al., 2001) is needed as a tool to provide comparable 
safeguards against opportunistic behaviour from the side of the state.  
In the following chapters, we use the above theoretical framework to discuss tradable certificates 
for energy efficiency (EE) measures for the case of grid-bound energy
3. We assess the existing 
tradable certificate schemes in the UK and in Italy. The ultimate aim is to derive criteria to be 
 
2 Note that the term ”efficiency” is used here in a generic meaning, not exclusively meaning energy efficiency.  
3 The concept of tradable certificates has only been applied for grid-bound energy. However, it is per se also suitable 
for non-grid-bound energy. 
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met by and to develop recommendations for a successful and useful tradable white certificates 
schemes.  
Critical issues for successful schemes are a functioning market mechanism, the adequate choice 
of a target group, and measurement of the efficiency improvement as compared to a reference 
case:  
•  Market mechanism: Which criteria guarantee that an – artificial – market for certificates 
really becomes competitive? Does the specificity of energy efficiency investments allow for 
an efficient governance by markets for tradable certificates? Will trading be characterized by 
spot markets or by rather anti-competitive long-term over-the-counter contracts? Which 
minimum market size is needed, and which are the conditions regarding the tradability of the 
certificate that have to be met?  
•  Target group: What aspects have to be considered when deciding on the obliged parties? 
Who should be obliged to purchase certificates? Are electricity suppliers the right target 
group, or should fuel and heat suppliers be addressed, or the consumer himself?  
•  Additionality and measurability: Which energy efficiency technologies should be eligible for 
certificates? What exactly is an energy efficient technology? A narrow definition might ease 
measuring problems but at the same time reduce incentives for innovation approaches.  
Many of these challenges are similar to those involved by the project-based mechanisms (Joint 
Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism) within the Kyoto Protocol. We 
therefore refer to the respective discussions whenever useful. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: To begin, a brief review of the design of tradable 
certificate schemes in Italy and the UK is given, and experience with renewable portfolio 
standards recently implemented in a number of countries is analysed. Secondly, aspects of a 
successful design of a tradable certificate scheme for energy efficiency are discussed. In the final 
chapter, we summarise and discuss our findings .  
2  International experiences  
This section describes briefly two regulations with trading possibilities recently implemented in 
Europe. A short overview is given about trends in regulation for promoting renewable energies 
in Europe and the US. 
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2.1  The British Energy Efficiency Commitment 
The British “Energy Efficiency Commitment” obliges all electricity and gas suppliers to save a 
total of 62 TWh of fuel-standardised energy by 2005 against 2002 (Obligation 2001). This 
obligation only covers the energy supply to households. Only suppliers with more than 15,000 
customers need to meet the obligation. The total target is broken down into individual obligation 
in relation to individual market shares. Generally, all EE measures need to get approval by the 
regulator to achieve eligibility for the regulation scheme. The regulator has defined a number of 
standard EE measures that he accepts for fulfilling the obligation. The energy savings of these 
standards measures are quantified, too. Thus, energy savings need not to be metered measure-by-
measure, which allows for reducing transaction costs quite considerably. New and innovative 
schemes not contained in the list of standard measures are still possible but require independent 
verification. Subsidised supply of compact fluorescent lamps is accepted as an eligible measure 
to a limited extent per served customer.  
As another restriction, at least 50 % of the EE measures must take place in low-income 
households. Thus, the market for eligible EE measures is differentiated in low-income 
households and others. To encourage energy services, they will be rewarded with an additional 
50 % on top of the sum of energy savings of the single EE measures content of the energy 
service. Energy services are thereby defined as consisting of at least two different single EE 
measures with a single customer, and need to incorporate individual customer consultancy. The 
total energy savings over the lifetime of the EE measure will be awarded to the energy supplier 
initiating the EE measure. Future savings will be thereby discounted.  
The regulation does not provide tradable certificates. However, some limited flexibility is 
provided in two ways: 
•  Energy savings may be traded. The regulator needs to approve the trade. 
•  Individual obligations may be also traded. Again, this trade needs official approval. 
Thus, anonymous trade is not possible but only bilateral over-the-counter trade. Spot trade is not 
possible either. This trade will thus allow equalising marginal costs to a certain extent but it not 
provide any public information on prices of EE. In summary, we may characterise this system as 
a rather conventional command-control policy with some restricted flexibility concerning 
fulfilment of obligations. 
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2.2  Italian Energy Efficiency Certificate Trading 
In April 2001, two Ministerial Decrees set targets of reducing consumption of electricity by 
18.6 TWh/a and of gas by 15.1 TWh/a respectively against a business-as-usual scenario in the 
period of 2002 to 2006 (AEEG, 2002). This relates to between 5 and 15 % of the Italian Kyoto 
target (Malaman and Pavan, 2002). The national target is apportioned to electricity and gas 
suppliers with more than 100,000 customers according to their individual market shares. This 
translates to 22 obliged gas suppliers and 8 obliged electricity suppliers. At least 50 % of the 
individual obligations need to be covered by EE measures in the electricity sector, gas sector 
respectively whereas the remaining obligation may be fulfilled with any other EE measures. This 
means that for instance savings of heating oil are eligible, too. There exists a comprehensive 
illustrative list of eligible EE measures. The regulator issues certificates to obliged electricity and 
gas suppliers as well as Energy Saving Companies (ESCO) who have paid for EE measures. 
Trade of certificates does not need official approval. Trade can take any form from bilateral 
contracts to transactions on anonymous markets. A penalty is imposed in case of non-
compliance. Obliged suppliers are able to recover costs of EE measures through an additional 
fixed element in the variable tariffs. The regulator has fixed this recovery rate at a level of 0.017 
€ for every kWh saved energy. This guaranteed cost recovery (= guaranteed minimum price for 
certificates) is only granted to obliged suppliers and up to the amount of their individual 
obligation but is not granted e.g. to independent ESCOs. The difference between the guaranteed 
cost recovery and the costs of the EE measure is obliged suppliers’ profit. 
The success or failure of the trading scheme cannot yet be evaluated. The original deadline for 
compliance (May 2003) was shifted to the year 2004. At least, the saving targets set by the 
Italian regulator seem to be achievable since they are small compared to the energy saving 
potential (Pagliano et al., 2003). As long as actual specific energy saving costs are below the pre-
set recovery rate, the scheme behave as a Minimum Price Standard. In this case, independent 
ESCOs are disfavoured compared to the obliged suppliers since they cannot attain this minimum 
price themselves. With energy savings costs above the guaranteed minimum price, obliged 
parties will prospectively as much as possible try to fulfil their quota with EE measures that do 
not decrease their individual sales. Due to the rather limited number of market actors we expect 
bilateral trade rather than anonymous spot market trade with certificates if any at all.  
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2.3  Renewable Portfolio Standards 
To increase the market penetration of renewable energies, a range of regulations have been 
implemented in various European countries in recent years (Haas et al., 2004). Mainly, price 
regulations have been established. However, a number of countries (Italy, Sweden, United 
Kingdom) have recently turned to quantity regulations with tradable certificates (also called 
Renewable Portfolio Standards or quotas); others abandoned or postponed such plans (Austria, 
Denmark, the Netherlands). A tender system can currently only be found in Ireland. 
Fifteen U.S. states have recently implemented Renewable Portfolio Standards, often (but not 
always) as a component of electricity reform: These are Arizona, California, Connecticut, 
Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, and Wisconsin (DSIRE 2002). Some first success stories are beginning to 
emerge from Arizona, Texas and Wisconsin, and there is much hope for the standards in 
Massachusetts, Nevada, and New Jersey. However, to date, few of these policies have been 
operable for more than a year and several have not yet begun. The experiences with the Texan 
Standard show that certificates are mostly jointly trade in the framework of long-term contracts 
(Langniss and Wiser, 2003). The Renewable Portfolio Standards in several of these states do not 
contain very strong provisions and may do little to instil confidence in the renewable energy 
industry. 
In summary, we see a mixed picture of different renewable energy regulations in the USA and 
Western and Central Europe. Even though widely discussed, Renewable Portfolio Standards 
have only been recently implemented in a number of countries and states. It is important to note, 
that in spite of the broad attention Renewable Portfolio Standards have gathered in the scientific 
and political discussion no general trend towards Renewable Portfolio Standards can be seen to 
emerge. Countries are still establishing new price regulations (in Europe e.g. Austria, France) 
and others have postponed or cancelled plans for Renewable Portfolio Standards (in Europe e.g. 
Austria, Denmark and the Netherlands). Growth of electricity generating RE has predominantly 
take place in countries with price regulations. Tender systems have been only established in a 
few countries and have mostly ended now.  
2.4  Conclusions from existing experience 
Our review of implemented certificate schemes shows that white certificate schemes are still in 
their infancy. White certificate schemes still need to prove their feasibility and efficacy. So far, 
experience suggests that real-world schemes will get rather complex. Moreover, the theoretically 
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perfect markets for certificates are not likely to be the relevant model of the resulting governance 
for introducing more energy efficiency,but rather a trend towards regulation and hierarchy. 
Indeed, the two national white certificate schemes implemented up to now feature many 
elements of traditional regulation. This applies particularly to the British scheme with only a few 
elements which provide flexibility through trading. The setting-up of the Italian scheme is 
promising. However, it discriminates independent ESCOs against incumbent electricity and gas 
suppliers. 
3  Design of a Tradable Certificate Scheme for Energy Efficiency 
3.1  Basic Elements of a Tradable Certificate Scheme  
A scheme for supporting energy efficiency (EE) with a tradable certificate scheme comprises of 
several elements. First, a quantitative overall target needs to be set, either in absolute terms or 
relative to energy consumption. Secondly, the participants of the trading scheme have to be 
determined and obliged to take part. In a market environment for grid-bound energy like 
electricity, natural gas and district heating, the obliged parties can be energy generators, 
distributors, suppliers, or energy consumers themselves. Thirdly, a regulation is needed to 
translate the overall target to individual targets for the obliged parties. Fourthly, EE measures 
eligible to fulfil the respective obligation need to be defined carefully while considering a 
number of possible restrictions. There are several options for measures eligible to an EE scheme: 
•  The scheme may admit only certain EE measures (e.g. energy efficient light bulbs) and 
exclude others. 
•  The scheme may admit exclusively hardware installations eligible or also software measures 
such as information campaigns or customer education. 
•  The scheme may be constrained to EE measures, which economise on the same energy 
carrier the obliged party is supplying. 
•  Finally, the scheme may be restricted to EE measures related to the customers of the 
individual obligor to fulfil its target. 
These design options have to be weighed against their respective benefits and disadvantages. 
Economic theory suggests that the wider the definition of eligibility is and the lesser the 
restrictions are, the lower are the costs to fulfil an obligation. On the other hand, a lax definition 
of EE may result in limited comparability and measurability of EE measures and their effects 
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and thus reduce the efficacy of the regulation or increase transaction cost for monitoring the EE 
measure. 
Obliged parties prove the fulfilment of their target by presenting certificates that attest a certain 
amount of saved energy. These certificates are tradable, which allows obliged parties either to 
fulfil their obligations by own EE measures or to buy certificates from others. Here, some 
restrictions may apply: First, the regulator may control trade by asking for official approval for 
any transaction. Secondly, similar to the regulations for the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto 
Protocol, the parties obliged to increase energy efficiency may only be allowed to cover a certain 
share of their individual obligations by certificates bought on the market; this would force the 
obliged parties to undertake own EE measures in any case. Finally, a monitoring system needs to 
be established to issue and track certificates and to impose penalties when an individual 
obligation is not fulfilled. 
Here again, transaction costs and the market size are under question; the more complex the 
administrative procedure for trading and monitoring is, and the higher the share of the target that 
is to be covered “at home”, the smaller the certificate market will be, and the more the system 
will resemble a traditional command and control policy.  
3.2  Specificity of Energy Efficiency Investments 
Participation in a tradable certificates scheme depends on the specificity of the respective EE 
investments. EE investments can be specific or generic towards an investor’s commercial 
transactions. Specificity arises when EE assets are designed for specific purposes, e.g. 
production equipment which is of no or limited use for any other product. Specificity also arises 
when EE investments are solely undertaken to supply certain purchasers. For example, when a 
manufacturer runs a factory which supplies different goods for a number of customers, an 
enhancement of the factory buildings isolation would have the same low specificity as the rest of 
the production equipment. In contrast, enhancing a factory building, which houses highly 
specific assets, creates an investment with a higher specificity. Similar conclusions apply to 
efficiency improvements in production technologies and energy supply technologies. Specific 
investments may also occur as a consequence of regulation: When energy efficiency investments 
are undertaken to fulfil a specific regulatory obligation, assets may be highly specific when the 
investment would create no or only small benefits to the investor in the absence of the respective 
regulation. 
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TCE assumes that the higher the specificity of an asset, the larger are in general opportunities to 
raise efficiency. The reasoning is that assets which are adapted to specific purposes may be 
driven more efficient. Analogously, this applies to EE: EE potentials can thus be assumed largest 
with highly specific assets. Also, the higher the targets in reducing energy consumption are, the 
more specific the EE investments get. Or putting it the other way round, early energy savings 
may be achieved with less specific investments than more ambitious ones.  
Finally, without appropriate governance structures to safeguard quasi-rents from EE investments, 
these investments will not take place. Rents from specific investments are on risk with a 
governance based on pure, unregulated markets; in consequence, less EE investments than 
efficient will be undertaken as compared to a situation with some regulation. Thus, opportunity 
costs occur which we have earlier defined as one type of transaction costs, as governance costs. 
This TCE reasoning adds an important explanatory (yet similar) aspect to the existing discussion 
on barriers to EE investments, which focuses on the prohibitive effect of high upfront-
investments (Vine et al., 2003) and on the phenomenon of short payback periods stipulated by 
investors in energy efficiency measures (see DeCanio, 1993; Blumstein et al., 1980; Fisher and 
Rothkopf, 1989; Koomey, 1990, Levine et al., 1995, Stern and Aronson, 1984, Bhattacharjee, 
1993). 
However, so far, the above arguments only apply to commercial energy consumers. Commercial 
energy consumers consume energy to accomplish their business. Energy costs are part of their 
overall production costs. Against that, private households consume energy as part of their overall 
final consumption. Their extra income from reduced energy costs cannot be acquired by any 
transaction partner. It is not the threat of losing this extra income but search and information 
costs which detain households from investing in energy efficient appliances. Thus, their own EE 
investments may not be analysed with TCE.  
This picture changes when energy services or technologies are supplied rather than purely 
energy. Investments in the household sphere will make supply of the energy service more 
efficient. These investments may be highly specific or not in respect to the transaction between 
the household and the energy service provider. Examples for a highly specific investment are EE 
light bulbs. Albeit EE light bulbs themselves can be applied generic (their value is the same in 
the next best application), the energy service supplier’s costs of dispensing the bulbs are sunk 
costs. Thus, this part of the investment is entirely specific. Another example of specific 
investments is consultancy which is needed to identify the most appropriate energy efficiency 
measures. Standardised analysis and proposal formats help to keep investments in consultancy 
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rather generic. However, a more ambitious energy saving target requires individual consultancy, 
thus raising the specificity of the investment.  
Introducing Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) for commercial energy applications may 
reduce the specificity of EE investments. Take again the example of consultancy: The costs of 
gathering information for how to achieve best EE may be highly specific to a single consumer of 
energy. Against that, an ESCO might use the gathered information also with other customers 
thus their investment is less specific.
 The benefits from economies of scale may thereby exceed 
by far the benefits from the reduction of specificity in this case. There are also technical means 
to reduce specificity of EE investments e.g. movable CHP plants. 
To summarise, the analysis of specificity of EE investments reveals that the higher the EE target 
is, the less appropriate a pure governance by markets will be. A more hierarchical governance 
allows more specific investments, as it preserves the owner from the risk of sunk cost; thus more 
EE is achievable. Hierarchical (and not market) governance is crucial to secure transactions 
between those parties who are investing in EE and those who are paying for the EE measures in 
the end. Even when regulation creates a market, the actors on this market will tend to establish 
forms of hybrid governance with some elements of hierarchy such as long-term contracts. This 
hybrid governance will soften the ongoing “high-powered incentives” (Williamson, 1987, p. 90) 
to act efficiently that are constituent for pure markets. ESCOs may reduce the specificity of EE 
investments into search and information. EE policy should be thus targeted also on establishing 
ESCOs. 
3.3  Transactions in EE Tradable Certificate Schemes 
A tradable certificate scheme promises a higher degree of autonomy of decision, combined with 
prospected lower overall costs. This makes it more appealing to the obliged parties than other 
types of EE regulations (Langniss, 2003, p. 68 ff). However, the above discussion of design 
features and particularly of possible restrictions made already clear that a tradable certificate 
scheme for EE does not allow per se for more freedom to obliged parties than conventional 
command-and-control regulations or alternative instruments. 
So what kind of relations are then established through a certificate scheme? To answer this 
question with help of the TCE, we need to take a closer look on the additional transactions of 
certificates induced by a tradable certificate scheme for EE (Figure 1). These are  
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1.  Transactions between obliged parties (i.e. in most cases the energy supplier) and users of the 
EE measures, i.e. the energy service customer. 
2.  Transactions between obliged parties for the purpose of trading certificates. 
3.  Transactions of obliged parties with (non-obliged) Energy Service Companies (ESCO), 
which are independently accomplishing EE measures and marketing EE certificates.  
4.  Transactions of any trading party with broking intermediaries. 
With transactions of the first type, energy consumers will trade certificates to obliged parties. To 
generate certificates, the energy consumers need to invest. Thus, these transactions are crucial 
for achieving EE through a regulation based on tradable certificates. As we have shown, EE 
investments may be highly specific to this transaction. So, these transactions tend to be governed 
by hierarchy, for example through long-term contracts, to secure the investments; otherwise, 
they would not take place. Such long-term contracts, however, limit the freedom of obliged 
parties once they entered in long-term contracts. The obliged parties may instead choose to 
invest themselves in EE on the level of the final consumer. In this case, a contract needs to fix 
that certificates arising from the EE investment are to be transferred to the investor. Hence, this 
































Figure 1: Possible transactions of certificates induced by tradable certificate schemes. 
 
Alternatively, a regulation may assign the certificates to the investor. In that case, no transaction 
of certificates needs to take place. This option is equal to a situation where obliged parties fulfil 
their regulatory obligation by entirely internal business. This type of allocation of certificates 
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seems to be more appropriate to reality: Investments by energy companies or ESCOs are usually 
regarded as crucial to achieve more EE on the demand side. The regulation may even allocate 
the entire energy savings generated prospectively over the lifetime of the EE investment to the 
investor already at the time of investment. After commissioning of the EE investment neither the 
energy-consumer nor the obligor would then need to prove whether the energy savings actually 
took place. This implies a shift of risks from the investor to the regulator. Such an approach is 
only feasible in the case of measures with proven effectiveness and little opportunities for fraud 
like building insulation. However, as in both cases, i.e. certificate transactions governed by 
hierarchy or assigning directly certificates to the investor, the resulting governance does not 
provide an additional permanent incentive for the efficient use of energy, as pure markets would 
do. 
Trade of certificates between obliged parties will take place as long as marginal costs for EE are 
different for different obliged parties. Given a functioning market for certificates, such a trade 
system ensures that marginal costs of the regulation are the same for all obliged parties. 
Economies of scale may be realised by bundling demand for EE.  
In this context, it is worth to note that energy suppliers as obliged parties will also incorporate 
their opportunity cost due to decreased energy sales in their calculus of marginal costs of EE. 
Thus, acquiring certificates on the certificate market may be more favourable than realising EE 
with own consumers even if direct costs of EE with own customers are lower than certificate 
prices on the market. As long as the marginal income from energy sales (i.e. price minus variable 
costs) is larger than the difference between the price of certificates purchased on the market and 
the costs of generating certificate with own energy customers so long will it be more favourable 
to purchase certificates on the markets. We thereby assume that certificates available on the 
market do not lead to decreasing sales of the specific energy supplier. In other words: It is not a 
make-or-buy problem but rather about realising energy savings with own customers versus 
energy savings with other customers. Such calculation does however not consider external 
benefits from e.g. increased customer loyalty which may occur with EE programs with own 
customers. Note also, that the same EE measure may be less costly with existing customers than 
with others since existing information channels and knowledge about customers can be used in a 
favourable way. 
In the case that no specific assets are involved, i.e. when the generation of EE certificates is 
based on non-specific investments, trade on markets will be the prevailing and appropriate form 
of governance. As soon as specific investments are involved, the governance will tend to a more 
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hierarchical form with long-term contracts softening the continuous incentives to act efficient. 
However, investors ready to take over some risk might still choose to market certificates on the 
spot market. The same might be true if obliged parties generate certificates exceeding their own 
obligation to a small amount of their obligation. 
Energy service companies (ESCO) are in a similar position as obliged energy suppliers. This is 
particularly true for their relations towards energy consumers. Specific investments of ESCOs 
need to be secured by some hierarchical governance or long-term contracts as well. The 
possibility to trade EE certificates creates an additional income flow. Thus, ESCOs get less 
dependent on equipment-users’ payments. As far as specific investments are involved, certificate 
transactions tend to hierarchical governance. However, as we discuss below, the often small 
share of certificate trade may restrict both the benefits from the additional income as well as the 
need for more hierarchical governance. 
Brokers may facilitate trade of certificates and they may act as risk takers as well. Regarding the 
second issue, the same applies to brokers as was said on obliged parties and ESCOs, depending 
of course also on the broker’s readiness to take risks.  
One should be aware that income from certificate sale may only represent a small or even 
negligible part of the total income from EE investments. As far as energy consumers themselves 
undertake EE investment, income from reduced energy bills is often sufficient to cover the extra 
costs of the investment, as many calculations on feasible EE potentials show. But even when 
energy suppliers as investors are concerned, benefits for example from strengthened customer-
loyalty may entirely offset the costs of EE investment and reduced energy sales. Securing 
income from selling certificates may be thus less crucial than opening more opportunities for 
market governance. In these cases, an EE regulation of any kind is rather a means to raise 
awareness on EE potentials than a costly obligation. Tradable certificate schemes have thereby 
the advantage that market prices of certificates will reveal the low total costs of EE policy. 
3.4  Establishing the reference use of energy and verification of energy savings 
Issuing certificates for energy efficiency efforts presumes that these efforts can be measured. The 
underlying problem is not trivial. Two crucial issues are to be solved both in theory and in 
practice: First, what is the baseline for an energy efficiency improvement, and secondly, how 
can energy savings be metered?   
The process of establishing the reference situation, of monitoring and determining the realised 
energy savings involves a number of methodological issues. To determine the energy savings 
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resulting from an energy efficiency activity, the eventual energy consumption has to be 
compared to a reference situation (or baseline or business as usual) without additional saving 
efforts. But what exactly is the baseline, and which reference technology should be accepted and 
which time frame applied? How can energy savings be identified as supplemental or additional 
to a reference development? What are the relevant boundaries for a project, and how can leakage 
effects be minimised? The related practical problems are multiple. 
First and foremost, the reference use of energy is, by definition, counterfactual and thus imposes 
considerable uncertainty to the determination of investment additionality. The calculation of the 
baseline scenario hast to take into account likely changes in relevant regulation and laws, the 
trend in autonomous efficiency improvements and changes of other basic variables such as the 
development of markets for products of the project (Michaelowa and Fages, 1999, p. 173).The 
baseline hence includes assumptions which inevitably create a certain level of uncertainty. A 
study conducted for eastern European countries estimates the range of counterfactual uncertainty 
for the case of greenhouse gas emission reductions, related to the underlying assumptions used 
for the respective baseline calculation, to be as high as ±55 % for cogeneration projects and ±35 
% for demand side projects (Parkinson et al., 2001).  
Secondly, the relevant system boundary has to be determined and will vary, depending on the 
respective EE measure. The system boundary also establishes the reference case for determining 
the energy savings of the EE measure. For example, end-use efficiency measures could have an 
impact on the related upstream levels and should ideally be considered. This, however, is not 
practical because it would impose prohibitively high information or transaction cost (Gustavsson 
et al., 2000).  
The third issue, directly related to the system boundary, is the risk of producing leakage 
(Parkinson et al., 2001): When the system boundary is set too narrow, energy savings may be 
overstated. Take for example a total demand of generation capacity of about 100 MW. When the 
system boundary is drawn around a generation plant with a capacity of 100 MW, and this plant is 
replaced by an efficient cogeneration plant with a capacity of 50 MW, half of the demand will be 
covered by generators outside the system boundaries, regardless their respective efficiency 
properties. Also, a number of indirect effects may be disregarded, such as an autonomous 
reduction in demand. In this example, both effects would lead to overstating real energy savings.  
A fourth and crucial issue (and criterion) is the practicality and cost-effectiveness of a baseline 
methodology. Both establishing a relevant baseline and monitoring energy savings implies cost 
to the project developer and also to the government or regulator. The cost of monitoring and 
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evaluation has been estimated to amount to about 5-10% of the project budget, which of course 
depends on many factors and assumptions (Vine and Sathaye, 2000). Relative transaction cost 
are even higher in the case of small-scale energy saving technologies and of private households 
(DIW 2003). Even worse, as it is in the case of demand side management programmes, indirect 
behavioural and positive spill-over effects are difficult to be calculated and distinguish from an 
autonomous development without the EE measure (Gustavsson et al., 2000). Both factors 
encourage investors to overstate the actual savings with the aim to receive and sell more “white” 
certificates. It also stimulates the appearance of free riders, i.e. participants that would also have 
invested in an energy efficiency project in the absence of the tradable white certificates scheme. 
These effects increase the regulatory expenses on the side of government for monitoring the 
accuracy of reported energy savings.  
A further aspect to be discussed is the issue of how to treat no-regret measures in the baseline 
determination. By definition, no regret means that no additional cost are implied, as the 
investment is entirely or even more than covered by the related energy savings. However, these 
investments did not take place without the EE programme. The additionality criterion hence 
needs a careful definition in order not to inhibit such investments.  
The above (and further) issues have been addressed for the case of the flexible mechanisms of 
the international climate protection regime (Kyoto Protocol) in a large body of literature in the 
last few years (e.g. Viloette et al. 2000 for baselines in the case of energy efficiency; for 
baselines in general see Ellis, Bosi 2000; Bosi 2000, Ellis 2001; Bode et al. 2001 and Ellis 
2002). Therein, a number of methods have been suggested and may mostly be applied to the case 
of energy efficiency certificates.  
Regarding the system boundaries, it is mostly recommended to use project-based baselines 
(Michaelowa and Fages, 1999; Parkinson et al., 2001). The reason is that the degree of 
uncertainty is significantly higher in the case of sectoral or country-related baselines because of 
the uncertainty related to assumptions about other than project-related variables. Even then, 
however, a number of issues need to be treated. For example, there may be a difference between 
baselines for a replacement investment as compared to additional capacity. In the first case, the 
energy efficiency investment may be compared to an existing plant or appliance it is supposed to 
replace. However, as long as the respective replacement investment is in time anyway, it is 
difficult to evaluate if the investment is more than business as usual-progress in terms of the 
energy efficiency. In the second case of additional capacity, the baseline needs to reflect the 
technology that would otherwise be implemented.  
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For a regulator, the appropriateness of such an individualised baseline approach via reference 
technologies chosen by the investor is difficult to assess, and information / transaction costs are 
high. The regulator may therefore decide to offer a standardised approach. For example, a certain 
performance benchmark for individual or a class of appliances or technologies could be 
determined against which all newly implemented technologies are then evaluated with regard to 
the energy savings. Such a benchmark could be either the average existing, a historical state, or 
the state of the art of energy efficiency technologies. Laurikka (2002) shows that such relative 
baselines or performance benchmarks indicate in a more realistic manner the energy savings 
obtained. The argument is that benchmarks help to avoid uncertainties about the activity level of 
a project. In any case, standardisation allows for significant reductions in the related transaction 
cost.  
Last but not least, a number of more or less practicable and accurate monitoring methods have 
been suggested (Vine and Sathaye, 2000, p. 200). Here, again, a standardised approach may ease 
the supplemental burden of transaction cost.  
The major issue remains the level of transaction cost involved by the method chosen: The 
accuracy of complex but expensive methods has to be weighed up against the inaccuracy of 
rough but cost-saving methods. Here, it is probably necessary to accept a “satisficing” 
description of a baseline and to define appropriate control mechanisms (for example, comparison 
groups or scientific studies about likely baselines). Another approach would be to offer 
standardised baselines for project categories and to offer a possibility to submit individual 
baselines in case that the standard does not fit to the project.  
To summarise, both theoretical considerations and practical experiences show that assessing the 
success of energy efficiency measures in quantitative terms involves high transaction cost. 
Standardised baselines and monitoring procedures may alleviate the measurability problem. In 
the case of the flexible mechanisms, the approach is two-pronged: first, to define a set of 
principles to be followed, i.e. the project proposal has to outline the expected emission 
reductions in a transparent and comprehensible way on a project basis, and secondly, to allow for 
simplifications in the case of defined project categories, for example small-scale projects. 
Analogous standards and procedures may be introduced in the case of the tradable white 
certificates scheme.  
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3.5  Who should be obliged? 
In this section we will discuss some aspects related to the choice of who should be obliged to 
fulfil a certain reduction of energy consumption. In a market environment for grid-bound energy 
like e.g. electricity, natural gas and district heating, the obliged parties can be either energy 
generators, distributors, suppliers or energy consumers themselves. To date, energy suppliers 
seem to be the most appropriate choice for some reasons, adapted from (Wuppertal, 2002): 
•  The obligation will support the development of energy suppliers to become providers of 
genuine energy services. 
•  This way the incentive structure for energy suppliers changes from maximisation of energy 
sales to maximisation of energy service sales. 
•  Supply companies have direct access to energy consumers so they can build their energy 
efficiency efforts upon existing customer relations and existing infrastructure. 
Against that, energy generators have generally only poor knowledge on the demand side. Since 
distribution remains a natural monopoly even in liberalised markets, distributors do not act under 
competitive pressure. Incentives to lower costs are thus smaller in comparison with those parties 
acting under competition. An obligation directly imposed on the final energy consumer would 
directly motivate changes in consumption patterns. However, energy supply companies can be 
regarded as a more appropriate addressee, as they experience lower transaction costs both with 
the regulator and the obliged parties, and also may realise economies of scale with respect to 
information and specific knowledge on energy efficiency measures as compared to the individual 
consumer. A synthesis between the options of obligating consumers vs. obligating suppliers is to 
obligate the customers but relegate the obligation by default to energy suppliers; this can be 
found in the Swedish proposal for a certificate trading scheme for electricity from renewable 
energy sources (Elcertifikat, 2001). A right to apply for fulfilling the obligation themselves 
remains with customers. This will allow particularly large energy customers to realise own EE 
potentials and benefiting from the regulation. 
Regulations tend to focus on grid-bounded energy since these sectors have been regulated 
traditionally for reasons of natural monopolies. Thus, public influence in this sector has been 
large. However, there is no reason for not widen the obligation for EE also to non-grid-bounded 
energy carriers like heating oil or even transport fuels. Particularly concerning the heat market, 
this would avoid distortion of markets which otherwise occur when solely natural gas or district 
heating suppliers are obliged. 
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3.6  Market Features and Compatibility with Emission Trading  
Policy instruments with tradable certificates to balance obligations are particularly favourable 
compared to command-control policies, if large differences exist between individual marginal 
costs of EE measures of obliged parties. The larger these differences the larger will be the 
induced trade of certificates. Presumably, differences in marginal costs get larger the wider the 
scope of the regulation in terms of accepted EE measures and spatially is.  
Conventional economic theory suggests that a market will produce the best results  
•  When the traded goods are homogenous,  
•  When information is perfectly transparent to all market actors (buyers, sellers, 
intermediates), and  
•  When a certain critical minimum market size is exceed.   
These three features are all interlinked: The energy efficiency certificates should best be issued 
in the same form and size, for example denoting “100 kWh saved” or – in the case of an 
environmentally focussed certificate – denoting one ton CO2 saved and so on. The critical 
market size is the easiest achieved when there are not too many different products and parallel 
markets. Perfect information allows for access of many buyers and sellers to a market (including 
international actors), and information (i.e. transaction) costs are minimised when goods are 
homogenous and when transparency is guaranteed for. It is for these reasons that stock 
exchanges are usually quoted closest to a perfect market.  
In the case of energy efficiency certificates, these aspects also have to be considered. First and 
most important, defining and issuing a homogenous certificate is indispensable. This 
simultaneously eases the information problem and thus the transaction cost involved on the level 
of the certificate market. Eventually, the market size is the larger the more energy efficiency 
measures are included into the trading scheme or the larger the obligation (or quota) for the 
target group is being set. Hence an international EE certificate scheme with many participating 
countries would give the most benefits. However, as experiences with e.g. the flexible Kyoto 
mechanisms or an uniform European regulation to promote renewable energy shows, it is very 
difficult to establish such an international regime. It is thus very unlikely that an international EE 
certificate scheme will occur in the nearby future. Reversely, there is leeway for national 
schemes. All kinds of EE measures with all kind of energy consumers should be awarded with 
the same type of homogeneous certificate. No different partial obligations for certain 
technologies should be imposed since this would differentiate markets thus reduce competition. 
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Such an approach would leave decisions for the most cost-efficient energy efficiency to the 
market for certificates. Yet, one may aard innovative approaches and appliances like e.g. specific 
energy services with additional certificates to acknowledge difficulties arising for new products 
and entrants into the market place. 
To date, EE is for the most part being appreciated as a contribution to reducing the 
environmental impacts of energy use, and more specifically to the reduction of emissions, 
particularly of green house gas emissions (GHG). Many countries see EE as part of their climate 
protection strategy. One may therefore ask why an additional tradable certificates regime should 
be established. Furthermore, any plan to introduce efficiency-oriented tradable permits as 
discussed in this paper has to take into consideration existing or planned market-based policy 
instruments for EE, because it otherwise runs the risk of creating a parallel market. This may 
result either in double transaction cost for the participating actors when the markets are 
completely separate, or in a smaller market size for one of the two trading mechanisms.  
In Europe, an emission trading scheme (ETS) for greenhouse gas emissions will be implemented 
by the year 2005. However, some serious shortcomings of the ETS have to be stated. In 
particular, it is limited to about half of the industrial energy consumers but will not address 
households, trade and the other half of industry. Moreover, the motivation to promote EE goes 
beyond reducing emissions from energy generation. It also includes enhancing security of supply 
and raising the competitiveness of industry by increasing the overall efficiency. It is therefore 
still reasonable to introduce a white certificate scheme even in the presence of a European 
emission trading scheme. A possible adjustment may be to exclude those parties from an 
obligation within the white certificate scheme who are already obliged within the ETS. However, 
one has to be aware that potential benefits from a white certificate scheme against other 
mechanisms get smaller or even disappear. This is because the emission market is differentiated, 
the size of the market for white certificates is only sub-optimal and information costs of involved 
parties are increasing. 
4 Conclusion 
In our paper, we discussed conditions and criteria to be met for a successful system of tradable 
white certificates. Based on the theoretical framework of Transaction Cost Economics we 
elaborated these issues as well as the related problems. Theoretically, a regulation to promote 
energy efficiency via tradable white certificates allows equalising the individual marginal costs 
of all obliged parties. Moreover, bundling of demand for EE can activate potential economies of 
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scale. This also creates opportunities for Energy Service Companies and hereby promotes a shift 
from traditional energy suppliers towards energy service providers. Moreover, an innovative 
approach such as a white certificate scheme may help to overcome political barriers which more 
traditional forms of policies and regulations are facing. Compared to traditional command and 
control regimes, the flexibility provided through the trading mechanism might be particularly 
appealing to those who get obliged and have to bear the burden. 
To date, an EE oriented scheme of tradable certificates cannot be discussed without considering 
the EU emissions trading scheme, which will be introduced by 2005. Within this scheme, energy 
efficiency will also play an important role. It would not make sense to create two parallel 
markets for EE certificates on the one hand, and for CO2 certificates on the other hand, because 
transaction cost involved would be much higher. However, the above reasons for promoting EE 
should also make clear that the benefits of EE go beyond pure mitigation of GHG. Thus a GHG 
policy alone does not provide sufficient incentives to mobilise all the benefits that come with EE. 
A specific policy to foster EE is thus grounded in the specific bundle of public benefits linked to 
enhanced EE. The same arguments apply for promoting renewable energies.  
Given a number of conditions being met, including the standardisation of baselines and 
monitoring to reduce transaction cost on the side of the government, a tradable certificate 
scheme allows to promote EE without additional burden for public budgets. At the same time, 
the total burden on customers of achieving a predetermined level of EE may be minimised. 
However our analysis based on transaction cost economics as well as experiences from green 
certificate trade reveals that, long-term contracts rather than spot trade are likely to be the 
prevailing form of governance for energy efficiency investments reducing considerably the 
potential benefits of a tradable certificate scheme. 
Tradable certificate schemes are not the only policy option promising the benefits of markets. 
Tenders organised by public authorities and financed out of general surcharges may serve the 
same purpose as well. Considering transaction costs, such an option might even distort less 
competition between larger and smaller suppliers than certificate trade.  
To conclude, more research and further experiences with white certificates is needed for a proper 
assessment of this policy option. The nature of many EE measures, in particular their transaction 
and investment specificity, restricts the potential market in practise. The definition of eligible EE 
measures also remains a challenge in terms of balancing transaction cost reductions related to a 
wider, flexible formulation of eligibility versus the risk of stimulating business as usual rather 
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than really additional energy efficiency measures. The definition problem is also reflected in two 
realised regulations on EE comprising also flexible market elements.  
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